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1977 AMENDMENTS TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT
GEORGE SHELDON*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1974 the Florida Legislature enacted a comprehensive rewrite
of the Florida Administrative Procedure Act (APA).1 The 1974 Act
was subsequently amended in 1975 and in 1976.2 This article will
review certain additional amendments made during the 1977 regular session of the Florida Legislature. An effort will be made to
provide some insight into the current direction of the legislature in
adjusting the Administrative Procedure Act.
Early in 1977, Representative J. Hyatt Brown, 3 Chairman of the
House of Representatives Committee on Governmental Operations,
appointed a select subcommittee to review the Administrative Procedure Act and to suggest any changes which might be needed.' The
subcommittee mailed an extensive questionnaire to all state agencies requesting information on the operation of the Administrative
Procedure Act within their particular agency.5 That questionnaire
was designed to facilitate evaluation of the operation of the Joint
Administrative Procedure Committee' as it reviewed agency rules
and proposed rules. The questionnaire specifically sought individual
agencies' evaluations of the hearing officers in the Division of Ad* Member, Florida House of Representatives, elected 1974. J.D. 1978, Florida State
University College of Law; B.A. 1968, Florida State University. Member, Florida House
Select Subcommittee on the Administrative Procedure Act.
1. Administrative Procedure Act of 1974, ch. 74-310, 1974 Fla. Laws 952 (current version
at FLA. STAT. ch. 120 (1977)) (amending ch. 61-280, 1961 Fla. Laws 538).
2. Ch. 75-191, 1975 Fla. Laws 368; ch. 76-276, 1976 Fla. Laws 750 (requiring economic
impact statements on proposed agency rules); ch. 76-207, 1976 Fla. Laws 370 (reinstatement
of certain dismissed actions); see Levinson, The FloridaAdministrative ProcedureAct: 1974
Revision and 1975 Amendments, 29 U. MIAMI L. REv. 617 (1975).
3. Dem.-Ormond Beach.
4. News release from Rep. Brown appointing Rep. George Sheldon (Dem.-Tampa), Rep.
H. Lee Moffitt (Dem.-Tampa), and Rep. Curtis Kiser (Rep.-Palm Harbor) (Jan. 4, 1977).
5. See House Gov't Operations Comm., Agency Questionnaire Re: Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (to forty-eight state and regional agencies) (Jan. 20, 1977) [hereinafter cited
as Questionnaire]. Many of the letters, reports, suggested revisions, drafts of bills, and
questionnaires documented in this article are materials used by the Florida House of Representatives Select Subcommittee on the Administrative Procedure Act during the 1977 legislative session. These materials are available through the Florida Legislative Library Ser-vice,
Tallahassee, Florida. Materials located in the subcommittee files will be documented [on
file with committee].
6. The Joint Administrative Procedures Committee was established as a legislative check
on legislatively created authority. Ch. 76-131, § 4, 1976 Fla. Laws 216 (current version at FLA.
STAT. § 120.545 (1977)).
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ministrative Hearings (DOAH)7 and also asked how many times the
agencies had agreed with DOAH-recommended orders.8 Other inquiries included questions on agency compliance with committee
requirements, and questions regarding the specific number of
agency personnel involved in agency compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act.9
Responses to the questionnaire ranged from applause to criticism
to skepticism."° Some of the most critical comments came from
various community college presidents throughout the community
college system:
Rulemaking procedures used by community colleges are not
enhanced or improved by the APA . . . . The public notice requirements of APA waste time and money. Unlike most administrative agencies a community college's rules have little impact on
the public at large but have substantial impact on the college
community . . . . We have been put to a lot of expense without
any observable benefit to anyone as a result of the APA requirements."
Yet another community college president observed that the "application of APA to the community college system may have had an
indirect benefit, in that through a review of the Act, by college
administrators and their legal advisors, some improvements have
been made in college policy and procedure."'" Nonetheless, even
that president went on to charge that "[iut would have been better
though had community colleges been exempt from the formal requirements of the Act and only encouraged to use those portions
relevant to their needs to build on the existing procedures of their
organizations.' 3 Many presidents, however, went on to recommend
to the subcommittee outright exemption for community colleges
from the provisions of the APA.11
7. See FLA. STAT. § 120.65 (1977).
8. See Questionnaire, supra note 5.
9. Id.
10. As of Friday, February 4, 1977, twenty-nine of the forty-eight executive agencies to
which questionnaires had been sent had replied. The House Governmental Operations Committee prepared a summary of those replies. Fla. H.R., House Gov't Operations Comm.,
Summary of Results-APA Questionnaire (undated) [hereinafter cited as Summary of Results].
11. Letter from Dr. Harold H. Kastner, Jr., Ass't Director, Div. of Community Colleges,
Dep't of Educ., State of Florida, to author, with summary of responses of community college
presidents concerning Questionnaire, supra note 5 (March 23, 1977).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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School boards were no different from community colleges in desiring exemption from the Administrative Procedure Act. Specific legislation was introduced in 1977 to exempt the school boards from the
provisions of chapter 120.', Other agencies of state government were
less direct in their opposition and requests for alteration but nonetheless questioned the value of the APA.1"
House Bill 1100 and Senate Bill 747, designed to expressly exempt
both school boards and boards of trustees of community colleges
from chapter 120, died in the Senate Education Committee." However, after reviewing the responses from community colleges and the
School Board Association, the legislature did exempt the development of curriculum by an education unit from the definition of a
rule.' 8 Educational units or units of government "with jurisdiction
in only one county or a part thereof" were relieved of the necessity
to give notice of emergency rules in the Florida Administrative
Weekly." But the subcommittee took no further action to exempt
educational units from provisions of the APA. 0
Agencies throughout state government, however, continued to
submit proposals for exemptions and alterations in the provisions
of the APA throughout the 1977 session." Some of those proposals
would have (1) allowed a Cabinet member to use a designee instead
2
of a hearing officer from the Division of Administrative Hearings;
(2) required the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee to set
its agenda of possible objections in advance of its meetings and
15. See Fla. HB 1100 (1977); Fla. SB 747 (1977).
16. Summary of Results, supra note 10.
17. The House Governmental Operations Committee reported HB 1100 unfavorably on
May 6, 1977. FLA. H.R. JouR. 474 (Reg. Sess. 1977). The Senate Governmental Operations
Committee had initially reported SB 747 favorably, but the bill died in the Committee on
Education on June 3, 1977. FLA. S. JouR. 204 (Reg. Sess. 1977); LEGISLATIVE INFORMATION
DIVISION, JOINT LEGISLATIVE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE, HISTORY OF LEGISLATION,

SESSION

261 (1977)

(Senate Bill Actions Report) [hereinafter

cited as

1977

REGULAR

HISTORY

OF

LEGISLATION].

18. Ch. 77-453, § 2, 1977 Fla. Laws 1831 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.52(4) (1977)).
19. Id. § 3 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.54(9)(a)(3) (1977)).
20. No other proposals recommended by the school boards or by community colleges were
included in SB 553 (1977), ch. 77-453, 1977 Fla. Laws 1831.
21. See, e.g., Fla. SB 481 (1977) (Dep't of Offender Rehabilitation exemption); Fla. SB
547 (1977) (Parole & Probation Comm. exempt when granting or revoking parole or conditional releases); and Fla. HB 1754 (1977); Fla. SB 343 (1977); Fla. SB 1152 (1977) (exemption
for workmen's compensation claims hearings). The Department of Offender Rehabilitation
exemption died in the House Committee on Governmental Operations on June 3, 1977, as

did the proposed Parole & Probation Commission exemption.

HISTORY OF LEGISLATION,

supra

note 17, at 173, 195 (Senate Bill Actions Report). Only the exemption for workmen's compensation claims hearings was granted. See FLA. STAT. §§ 120.54(15), .57(1)(a)(2), .63 (1977).
22. House Select Subcommittee on the Administrative Procedure Act, Summary of Proposed Changes in APA, attachment K (undated) [on file with committee].
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notify agencies; 3 (3) authorized hearing officers to award costs and
attorney's fees if the APA procedure was abused by any party;24 (4)
25
made hearing officers' orders final instead of merely advisory.
None of those proposals was acted upon favorably by the subcommittee. The subcommittee, however, granted additional power to
the Joint Administrative Procedure Committee and provided an
exemption from certain provisions of chapter 120 to the Department
of Banking and Finance.
II.

EXEMPTION GRANTED THE DIVISION OF BANKING OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE

One of the most controversial exemptions granted during the 1977
regular session was given to the Department of Banking and Finance. The exemption was granted on a trial basis for one year, after
which it will automatically expire. 2 The primary reason for the
controversy surrounding the exemption is its breadth. It covers
chapters 36 and 37 of the Florida Statutes, which relate to all banks,
savings and loan associations, and other financial institutions, and
is specifically aimed at the licensing procedures for those institutions. The exemption amends section 120.60 by adding a new
subsection (3), which provides in part: "(3) Unless otherwise specified in this subsection, proceedings for licensing or for approving
mergers pursuant to title XXXVI and XXXVII, Florida Statutes,
shall not be subject to sections 120.57(1) and 120.58, Florida Statutes."27
Having granted the department an exemption from salient provisions of the APA which dictate formal proceedings where substantial interests are affected, the legislature added additional language
to require the department to adopt certain rules of procedure to
assure that the intent of the APA was carried out:
(a) In cases to which this subsection is applicable, the agency
shall adopt rules of procedure which will require:
1. The publication of notice within 21 days of receipt of application in the Florida Administrative Weekly;
2. That within 21 days of publication of notice, any person may
request a public hearing as provided by agency rule;
3. That upon the timely asserted request of any party the per23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at attachment L.
Id. at attachment M.
Id. at attachment A.
Ch. 77-453, § 9, 1977 Fla. Laws 1831.
FLA. STAT. § 120.60(3) (1977).
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son presiding at the hearing shall swear witnesses and take their
testimony under oath, and permit the parties to conduct crossexamination.
4. That the record shall contain those items specified in s.
120.57(1)(b)(5), Florida Statutes.
5. That the agency shall accurately and completely preserve all
testimony and evidence and, on the request of any person, it shall
make a full or partial transcript available at no more than cost.
(b) Review of the final agency order shall be in accordance with
section 120.68, Florida Statutes.
(c) Notwithstanding subsection (2) above, every application
for license for a new bank, new trust company, new credit union,
or new savings and loan association shall be approved or denied
within 180 days after receipt of the original application or receipt
of the timely requested additional information or correction of errors or omissions. Any application for such a license not approved
or denied within the 180-day period or within 30 days after conclusion of a public hearing held on the application, whichever is the
latest, shall be deemed approved subject to the satisfactory completion of conditions required by statute as a prerequisite to license
and approval of insurance of accounts by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation for a new bank, and by the Federal Savings
and Loan Insurance Corporation for a new savings and loan asso2
ciation. 1
The subcommittee members sympathized with the problems of the
comptroller and his staff but included these conditions on the exemption in order to further the intent of the Administrative Procedure Act.
The comptroller felt he had difficulty applying the provisions of
the APA to the granting of bank charters and other decisions. Initially he requested a complete exemption from chapter 120.29 This
request was not favorably received by the members of the subcommittee. After extensive subcommittee hearings and testimony, a
compromise agreement was reached. The comptroller had been successful in convincing members of the APA subcommittee that problems existed in his application of the provisions of chapter 120 to
the granting of bank charters and other proceedings. However, he
had done that on the basis of relatively subjective information
which had not been adequately verified or statistically proven to the
28. Id.
29. Dep't of Banking & Finance, APA Recommended Changes for the Dep't of Banking
& Finance (April 12, 1977) (submitted to House Administrative Procedures Select Subcommittee of Gov't Operations) [hereinafter cited as Dep't of Banking & Finance, Recommended
Changes].
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subcommittee. The subcommittee members sympathized with the
comptroller's problem and granted a partial exemption on a trial
basis to determine if, in fact, the problem identified by the comptroller actually existed.
Section 120.60(3)(c), which gives the department 180 days rather
than 90 days to conduct intensive background investigations of
bank charter applicants as well as to review and verify the voluminous data required in bank charter applications, appears to be readily justifiable. The comptroller's previous practice had been to request an extension from the Administration Commission for each
application because of the extensive background work necessary.
Essentially, the exemption allows the department to hold the
equivalent of a 120.57 proceeding on conditions prescribed by rule
before the department's own hearing officers, rather than before the
Division of Administrative Hearings' officers. 30 The new procedure
will allow the counterpart of the 120.57 proceeding within the Department of Banking and Finance to become the equivalent of the
current "Comptroller's Conference." 3' The comptroller's decision is
then subject to direct appeal under section 120.68, Florida Statutes,
rather than subject to a section 120.57(1) proceeding. 2
In support of the exemption, the department argued that chapter
120, and particularly section 120.57, placed state-chartered banks
at a disadvantage vis-a-vis national banks, thus causing a mass
exodus from the state banking system into the national banking
system. The Department of Banking and Finance stated:
[I]f a state bank were to apply for a branch the same time a
national bank does, for approximately the same general geographic
area, both banks might contest the granting of the branch charter
to the other. Under the present statutory scheme, if the state
branch is approved, the national bank can petition for a 120.57
hearing, possibly followed by an appeal to the District Court of
Appeal, and tie up the opening of the new branch for at least one
year, probably longer. On the other hand, the state bank basically
has right to an informal hearing, if requested within 15 days of
notice of filing, to be held at the regional level. If the results of the
hearing are unsuccessful [for the protesting state bank], the national branch could be open within months, unless the state bank
30. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ch. 3C-9 (Rules of the Department of Banking and Finance,
Procedural Rules for Processing of Applications for Licenses and Mergers Pursuant to Titles
XXXVI and XXXVII, F.S.) (implementing FLA. STAT. § 120.60(3) (1977)).
31. See generally FLA. STAT. ch. 659 (1977).
32. Id. § 120.60(3)(b).
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of the Currency to court, which is
takes the [U.S.] Comptroller
3
rarely successful.1
The question remains whether this picture of competition between state and national banks is an accurate one. The comptroller
will be required to provide additional statistical information to verify this contention if the legislature is to extend the exemption it has
granted to him. The preceding scenario envisions banks competing
for branches in the same area before different sovereignties as if
each government regarded its banking system as mutually exclusive
of the other in terms of competition, opportunity for successful operation, and public convenience. That is not necessarily the case.
Florida's banking code explicitly requires that the Department of
Banking and Finance "not approve . . . [an] application until, in
its opinion . . . [1local conditions assure reasonable promise of
successful operation for the proposed bank . . . . 3 An almost
identical provision appears regarding branch banks in the rules of
the department.3 1 Such a provision requires that banks, branches,
and proposed banks within close proximity to an applicant's proposed location be taken into consideration. The Federal Banking
Code has similar provisions. 3 Thus, both the comptroller of Florida
and the United States Comptroller of the Currency are required to
know what the other is doing.
The comptroller's contention assumes that proponents of a proposed federal branch bank could request and be granted a 120.57(1)
proceeding as a substantially affected party to contest a proposed
state branch bank. At the same time that that contention was being
made, however, the department was embroiled in litigation as to
whether even an existing state bank had that right. In Gadsden
State Bank v. Lewis, 31 the comptroller denied an existing bank a
120.57(1) hearing to contest a proposed branch bank to be located
close to the existing bank's established facility, saying: "Gadsden
has no standing and was not a proper party or a person whose
substantial interests were determined by an agency. Section
'3
120.57(1), Florida Statutes.
Counsel for the Department of Banking and Finance argued
strongly in support of that position before the First District Court
of Appeal in June of 1977. This argument appears to be in direct
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Dep't of Banking & Finance, Recommended Changes, supra note 29, at 8.
FLA. STAT. § 659.03(2)(b) (1977).
FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 3C-13.07(1)(e).
See 12 U.S.C. §§ 26, 36 (1970).
348 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
Id. at 346.
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conflict with the proposition that existing national banks would be
entitled to a 120.57(1) proceeding. The First District Court of Appeal, however, reversed the department's decision and remanded
the matter for a hearing, thus indicating that the department's
position taken before the subcommittee was reasonable regarding
the right of proposed branches to invoke a 120.57(1) proceeding. 9
Further, the department was displeased with the recommended
orders from hearing officers that infringed on decisions ordinarily
within the discretion of the comptroller. The comptroller argued
that DOAH's hearing officers were making decisions he was elected
to make and were leaving him with the responsibility for the results.
McDonald v. Department of Banking and Finance0 illustrates the
problem and suggests a possible cure. McDonald unsuccessfully
applied for a bank charter. After denial, he petitioned for a 120.57(1)
hearing. The hearing officer, noting the "long delay between the
Comptroller's conference, the Comptroller's order of denial, and the
date of the present hearing, as well as the fact that the Comptroller
declined to reach any conclusion as to four of the six criteria required to be met for a charter. . .,"I' allowed all relevant evidence
to the date of the hearing. This hearing was apparently the first time
this had occurred and set the trend about which the department
later complained. The hearing officer made detailed findings of fact
and law in a recommended order granting the contested charter.
The comptroller later rejected the findings of fact submitted as not
being based on competent substantial evidence, and, in a final
order, again denied the McDonald charter.4 2 McDonald appealed to
the First District Court of Appeal.
One of the primary issues dealt with by the First District involved
hearing officers' findings of fact in the contest of bank licensure
proceedings. Judge Robert Smith, writing for the court, pointed out
the dilemma forced upon the comptroller by the conflicting themes
of the Administrative Procedure Act and the Florida Banking Code.
Judge Smith noted at the outset:
The Legislature has committed to the Department and Comptrol39. Id. If the Department of Banking and Finance wholly fails to look into any of the areas
required by section 659.03, Florida Statutes, they may be in violation of the Banking Code,
and may therefore be subject to an injunction which may be brought by an affected existing
bank. See National Bank v. Green, 175 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1965); FLA. STAT.
§ 659.56 (1977). See also McDonald v. Dep't of Banking & Fin., 346 So. 2d 569, 577 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
40. 346 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
41. Id. at 576.
42. Id.
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ler wide discretion in determining applications for banking authority. . ..
The APA does not compromise the Department's ultimate authority over banking applications. Nor does it strip the Comptroller, a constitutional officer who is the head of the Department, of
the discretion in such matters which is finally his. In three important respects, however, the APA affects the scope and the manner
of exercise of agency discretion: (1) the APA prescribes the process
by which disputed facts are found; (2) it requires that the agency
adopt as rules its policy statements of general applicability, requires agency proof of incipient policy not expressed in rules and
permits countervailing evidence and argument; and (3) it requires
an agency to explain the exercise of its discretion and subjects that
explanation to judicial review. 3
As the court saw it, the principal objective was to allow the comptroller the exercise of his discretion, while according affected parties
procedural rights granted by the APA. These conflicting themes
undoubtedly diverge at the point at which the DOAH hearing officer
submits findings of fact. The comptroller must justify his actions on
these findings of fact unless the findings are not based on
"competent substantial evidence." If they are not, the findings of
fact may be altered by the comptroller." The point is that, given
facts found by an outside hearing officer, the agency must justify
its exercise of discretion.
" 'Three due process checks to prevent arbitrary agency action are
the requirements that reasons be stated for all action taken or omitted, that reasons be supported by "the record," and that specific
judicial review procedures allow the courts to remedy defects of
substance.' "" The unstated fact that is implicit in McDonald is
that an outside hearing officer is essential to the APA scheme of
fairness and due process. The McDonald court eventually vacated
the comptroller's final order, which had rejected the hearing officer's findings of fact as not based on competent substantial evidence." In so doing, the court recognized the blur that emerges as
43.

Id. at 577 (citations omitted).
FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(b)(9) (1977) (agency may reject or modify conclusions of law
and interpretations of administrative rules made by the hearing officer, but may not reject
or modify findings of fact unless those findings were not based on competent substantial
evidence); see, e.g., Venetian Shores Home & Property Owners v. Ruzakawski, 336 So. 2d
399 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
45. Reporter's Comments on Proposed Administrative Procedure Act 20 (Mar. 9, 1974),
quoted in McDonald v. Dep't of Banking & Fin., 346 So. 2d 569, 584 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1977).
46. 346 So. 2d at 584-86.
44.
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factfinding moves toward opinion in the context of the banking
code. The hearing officer in McDonald made detailed findings of
fact. Yet, within the context of the highly technical and subjective
banking code, where did fact-finding end and opinion begin? The
First District Court of Appeal noted:
In determining whether substantial evidence supports the
agency's substituted findings of fact, a reviewing court will naturally accord greater probative force to the hearing officer's contrary
findings when the question is simply the weight or credibility of
testimony by witnesses, or when the factual issues are otherwise
susceptible of ordinary methods of proof, or when concerning those
facts the agency may not rightfully claim special insight ...
At the other end of the scale, where the ultimate facts are increasingly matters of opinion and opinions are increasingly infused
by policy considerations for which the agency has special responsibility, a reviewing court will give correspondingly less weight to the
hearing officer's findings in determining the substantiality of evidence supporting the agency's substituted findings. 7
Thus, it would appear that Florida courts not only have a feel for
the discretion-due process conflict raised by functions within the
comptroller's office, but also are sensitive and wary of the issue
ramifications. Judge Smith, in McDonald, noted that a positive
impact on this area may be made by further development and refinement of agency policy in the form of rulemaking. He noted that
the six standards for banking authority prescribed by section
659.03(2) are susceptible to implementation and interpretation by
the department's rules. But the court realized that the requirements
of section 120.54 could not be imposed on agency policy which is
emerging and being refined through the adjudicative process. Such
a requirement would lead to "bizarre effects.""
The agency's final order in 120.57 proceedings must describe its
"policy within the agency's exercise of delegated discretion" sufficiently for judicial review. By requiring agency explanation of any
deviation from "an agency rule, an officially stated policy, or a
prior agency practice," Section 120.68(12) (b) recognizes there may
be "officially stated agency policy" otherwise than in "an agency
rule"; and, since all agency action tends under the APA to become
either a rule or an order, such other "officially stated agency policy" is necessarily recorded in agency orders. All such rules and
47. Id. at 579.
48. Id. at 581.
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orders, cataloged by a subject-matter index, must be made available for inspection and copying by the public in an ever-expanding
library of precedents to which the agency must adhere or explain
its deviation."
It is not the sense of McDonald to tie agency hands by seizing on
the slightest policy declaration to invoke the requirements of section
120.54. Cases holding agency policy to be illegal rules have
arisen.5°McDonald makes it clear, however, that explanations of
agency reasoning can be delineated from such policy and will be in
proper cases. However, there may be drawbacks to the agency's
allowing such nonrule policy to appear too prevalent in its final
order:
Judicial review proceedings under Section 120.68 similarly press
for crystalization of agency discretion. The court's responsibility is
to allow the agency full statutory range for its putative expertise
and specialized experience. But, to the extent that agency action
depends on nonrule policy, Section 120.68 requires its exposition
as a credential of that expertise and experience."
One of the department's complaints with respect to the Division
of Administrative Hearings was that "full and unbridled discovery
is unleashed upon the top members of the Department, tying up
their time for quite literally days. ' 52 In McDonald, the testimony of
the director of the Division of Banking was taken in regard to the
agency's final order. To this the court replied:
In the case before us, the Department properly adduced testimony of the Director of its Division of Banking evaluating the
petition and to a limited extent expressing Department rationale
for disapproving it. To the extent the agency may intend in its final
order to rely on or refer to emerging policy not recorded in rules or
discoverable precedents, Section 120.53(2), that policy must be
established and may be challenged by proof. We recently approved, in another case, a hearing officer's order authorizing prehearing discovery of any Department nonrule criteria for determining statutory qualifications for authority to establish a savings and
loan institution. Lewis v. Life Say. and Loan Ass'n, 342 So. 2d 1031
(Fla. 1st DCA 1977).53
49.
50.
1977).
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 582 (citations and footnote omitted).
See, e.g., State, Dep't of Admin. v. Stevens, 344 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
346 So. 2d at 583.
Dep't of Banking & Finance, Recommended Changes, supra note 29.
346 So. 2d at 582.
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In support of the exemption, the department also pointed out the
procedural problems it was having with the section 120.57(1) hearings. That section had usually been invoked as an appellate procedure. Commonly, banking applicants would wait until the entire
licensing procedure had taken place and had become final agency
action adverse to their position. Then, already having had a
"Comptroller's Conference" (a hearing similar to a 120.57 proceeding under the banking code), 5' 4 the adversely affected party would
invoke the provisions of section 120.57(1), and a DOAH hearing
officer would be called in to rehash the matter. The hearing officer
would, as required, promptly schedule a hearing complete with discovery .and would agree to entertain evidence available as of the
date of this second hearing. This action would place facts in the
record significantly different from those recorded at the department's hearing. Since many such facts relate to economic trends,
they are often subject to dramatic change.55 Undeniably, the hearing
officers were only doing their jobs. Yet the comptroller's frustration
was understandable. Parties were, indeed, being given two bites of
the apple at significant expense to the department.
As in McDonald, an application might be originally evaluated
during an economic slump and heard in a 120.57 proceeding after
the slump was over. On that issue, Judge Smith observed in a footnote:
[Tihe ensuing § 120.57(1) proceedings [after the Comptroller's
final decision] took on the misleading appearance of reviewing
rather than formulating agency action. While the APA permits an
agency so to plow the same ground twice, once before and again
after § 120.57(1) proceedings, neither the APA nor the model rules
require it. We do not decide the point here, but no reason appears
why agency rules could not require parties to request or waive
formal § 120.57(1) proceedings before the agency has acted informally, when it becomes evident that substantial interests will be
affected and there are factual issues. In the normal course of a
banking application proceeding those circumstances will appear at
or before the Comptroller's conference. 5
While Judge Smith's observation may not satisfy the comptroller

54. See FLA. STAT. § 659.03 (1977). See generally McDonald v. Dep't of Banking & Fin.,
346 So. 2d 569, 575 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
55. See, e.g., McDonald v. Dep't of Banking & Fin., 346 So. 2d 569, 575-77 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1977).
56. Id. at 578 n.5.
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completely, it does address the issue and offer a possible solution.
The McDonald decision is highly instructive and addresses most
of the problems complained of by the Department of Banking and
Finance with regard to the APA. There is little doubt that it will
have significant impact on the 1978 legislature's consideration of an
extension of the exemption. The decisions here relative to the comptroller's exemption indicates some of the conflicting testimony
heard by the committee which will no doubt be rehashed in the 1978
legislative session. However, the legislature's decision in 1977 to
grant the one-year exemption is by no means an indication that the
exemption will be extended.
III.

PROVISION TO GRANT JOINT ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES
COMMITTEE STANDING TO SUE INDIVIDUAL AGENCIES

Another controversial revision enacted during the 1977 legislative
session involved the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee.
At its inception, the committee had been charged primarily to
"[m]aintain a continuous review of the statutory authority on
which each administrative rule is based and, whenever such authority is eliminated or significantly changed by repeal, amendment,
holding by a court of last resort, or other factor, advise the agency
concerned of the fact" and to "[r]eview administrative rules and
advise the agencies concerned of its findings."57
Therefore, prior to the 1977 session of the Florida Legislature, the
major function of the committee was to review existing and proposed agency rules. The Administrative Procedure Act required that
agencies file with the committee copies of proposed rules and also
required the committee to review those rules to determine their
compliance with the Act." The committee was to determine, first,
whether the applicable rulemaking procedures of chapter 120 were
complied with in the promulgation of the specific rules and, second,
whether the substance of the rules was within the agencies' statutory authority. 9 If the committee found a proposed rule objectionable on either procedural or substantive grounds, it was to notify the
agency of that fact and set forth its objections. 0 If the agency refused to modify or withdraw the rule, the committee would then file
its objections with the secretary of state for inclusion in the Florida
Administrative Weekly. 61
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

FLA. STAT. § 11.60(2)(a)-(b) (1977).
Id.§ 120.54(10)(a).
Id.
Id.
Id.§ 120.54(12).
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Prior to 1977, the committee had no further formal power. The
sanctions it could impose on an agency which refused to comply
with its wishes were, for the most part, limited to simply informal
pressure. The committee could attempt to convince the agency of
the error of its ways or threaten the agency informally with the
specter of legislative action at the next session. Otherwise, the committee's only option was to file the objection.
Even so, the committee's review and objection could be potentially devastating to the rule if the agency chose to ignore the objection and proceed. The objection, when published with the requisite
explanation in the FloridaAdministrative Weekly, 2 could encourage rule challenges as provided by the Administrative Procedure
Act. 63 Thus the rule-challenger was easily provided not only with an
argument against the rule, but also with evidence in support of that
argument.
This statutorily established mechanism for review was intended
by the legislature both as an oversight device and as a means to keep
agencies within the confines of the authority established by statute.
The legislature apparently believed that agencies would quickly
cure objectionable provisions lest the agencies invoke the legislature's wrath at budget time or risk adverse actions on particular
legislation they desired. That says nothing of the threat that the
legislature would simply rewrite the statute in such a way as to
prohibit the specific implementation of the provisions of the rule.
But this prediction did not prove to be accurate. On thirteen
occasions in 1975, agencies chose to ignore committee objections and
proceed with implementation of their proposed rules.64 The legislature, particularly the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee,
did not look favorably on this independent decision making by
agency heads and addressed the issue during the 1976 legislative
session. In 1976, the legislature attempted a new approach and
passed a committee substitute for Senate Joint Resolutions 619 and
1398 (CS for SJR 619/1398), a proposed constitutional amendment,
along with implementing legislation." Governor Reubin Askew took
little time vetoing the implementing legislation" and began a vigor-

62. Id.
63. See id. § 120.56 (administrative determination of a rule).
64. Memorandum from Carroll Webb, Executive Director, Joint Administrative Procedures Comm., The Florida Legislature, to Rep. Robert C. Hector (Dem.-Miami), Vice
Chairman, Joint Administrative Procedures Comm. (April 8, 1977).
65. F A. S. Jou. 457 (1976).
66. Veto Message, Fla. SB 1384, Gov. Askew to Sec'y of State Smathers (June 29, 1976)
[hereinafter cited as Veto Message].
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ous public campaign opposing the constitutional amendment as a
violation of the separation of powers. 7 Consequently, CS for SJR
619/1398 was defeated at the polls. 8 A brief history of the 1976
legislative activity will give the reader some historical perspective
as to the action taken during the 1977 regular session. Senate Joint
Resolution 619 sought to amend article I, section 18, of the Florida
Constitution by providing that:
[any administrative rule of an agency of the executive branch
may be nullified by concurrent resolution of the Legislature, on the
grounds that the rule is without or in excess of delegated legislative
authority and may be suspended as provided by law on the same
ground; however, by a majority vote of the Governor and Cabinet
the suspension may be deferred until acted upon by the Legislature. Failure of the Legislature to disapprove the suspension at the
next regular session shall automatically reinstate the rule."
The proposed implementing legislation provided for the suspension
of agency rules upon agency refusal to remedy the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee's objection.70 Such a suspension could
have been deferred by a vote of the Governor and Cabinet and,
unless a suspension was deferred, it would have remained in effect
until legislative action either approved or disapproved of the rule.71
If the rule was subsequently approved by the legislature, the suspension would have been terminated.7 2 If the rule was disapproved, it
would have been permanently nullified.7"
Governor Askew's veto message stated his objections not only to
the legislation in question, but also to the constitutional amendment it sought to implement.7 The Governor believed that the legislature was usurping the power of the judiciary. The proposed constitutional amendment allowed the legislature to nullify agency rules
75
upon a finding that such rules exceeded their statutory authority.
Obviously, this allowed-indeed demanded-that the legislature
find as a matter of law that a rule exceeded statutory authority.
67. See Note, Legislative Efforts to Amend the Florida Constitution: The Implications of
Smathers v. Smith, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 747 (1977).
68. The final vote was 729,400 "for," and 1,210,001 "against." Official Vote, Fla. Gen.
Election, Nov. 2, 1976.
69. Fla. CS for SJR 619/1398 (1976).
70. Fla. CS for SB 1384, § 1 (1976).
71. Id. §§ 1, 2.
72. Id. § 2.
73. Id.
74. Veto Message, supra note 66.
75. See text accompanying note 69 supra.
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The Governor argued that this was an intrusion into the judicial
function which could easily fail to protect those supposedly protected by the rule. Allowing the legislature to make such a determination, the Governor contended, would "jeopardize the rights of the
individual citizen" by placing those rights in the political forum of
a legislative committee rather than in the impartial setting of a
courtroom." The Governor also questioned whether any decision by
the legislature to nullify an agency rule could be reviewed by the
judiciary." Finally, the Governor pointed out that the legislature
already possessed the power to nullify a rule by simply changing the
law.78
Resolutions such as the one proposing the constitutional amendment are ordinarily intended to support or oppose specific matters
before the legislature or to commend individuals and organizations
for noteworthy actions. They have been rarely used for substantive
purposes.79 The advantage, however, to those proposing the constitutional amendment was that concurrent resolutions do not require
gubernatorial approval in order to become effective. Hence, the
Governor had no check over the legislative action. 0
The road to the ballot for CS for SJR 619/1398 was soon impeded
by court action. Chesterfield Smith, former president of the American Bar Association, suing as a citizen, taxpayer, and elector of the
State of Florida, sought to enjoin the secretary of state from submitting the amendment to the voters at the general election. Smith
contended that the proposed amendment was a violation of the
separation of powers guaranteed by article 11, section 3, of the Florida Constitution; that the proposed amendment was not an amendment but in actuality a revision of at least three articles of the
constitution (in contravention of article XI, sections 3 and 5 of the
Florida Constitution); and, further, that the amendment would violate the one-man, one-vote guarantee of the fourteenth amendment
to the United States Constitution. 1 The Circuit Court for Leon
County granted the injunction, but the Florida Supreme Court reversed that decision.82 The proposed amendment was placed on the
76. Veto Message supra note 66, at 2.
77. Id. at 3.
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., Fla. HB 1139, HB 1289, HB 1563, HB 2378, HB 2381, HB 2382 (1977); Fla.
SB 1332, SB 1480, SB 1492 (1977).
80. Veto Message, supra note 66, at 3.
81. Smathers v. Smith, 338 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1976). For a thorough discussion of this case
and its ramifications, see Note, Legislative Efforts to Amend the Florida Constitution: The
Implications of Smathers v. Smith, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 747 (1977).
82. The supreme court decided only the question whether the proposed amendment was
in conformity with article XI, § 1, of the Florida Constitution, which sets forth the legisla-
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November, 1976, ballot. But it was soundly defeated by Florida
voters 83
The defeat of the proposed constitutional amendment at the polls
did not, however, prevent the legislature from attempting to find
another avenue through which to achieve its objective. Faced with
an increasing number of refusals by agencies to modify proposed
rules,"4 members of the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee
proposed yet another method of giving their committee the authority they felt it needed to overcome agency independence. This new
proposal gave the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee
standing to challenge administrative rules in the state courts on
behalf of the legislature or the citizens of the State of Florida. 5 The
legislation was sponsored by all six members of the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee,8 whose membership included House
Speaker Designate J. Hyatt Brown 7 and Senate President Designate Philip D. Lewis.8
As originally introduced, Senate Bill 553, now chapter 77-453,
Laws of Florida, was intended solely to give the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee standing to seek judicial review of the
validity or invalidity of any administrative rule to which the committee objected.8 9 As enacted into law, however, chapter 77-453 contains virtually all the important changes to the Administrative Procedure Act discussed in this article and passed during the 1977
legislative session.90 None of the changes in the 1977 revision is
nearly as significant or is likely to have as long-range an impact as
those in section 1 of the act. The "standing provision," embodied
ture's amendatory powers. Smith's other allegations of constitutional deficiency, the court
concluded, were insufficient. 338 So. 2d at 831.
83. See note 68 supra.
84. The number went from 13 in 1975 to 56 in 1976. Memorandum from Carroll Webb,
Executive Director, Joint Administrative Procedures Comm., The Florida Legislature, to
Rep. Robert C. Hector (Dem.-Miami), Vice Chairman, Joint Administrative Procedures
Comm. (April 8, 1977).
85. FLA. STAT. § 11.60(2)(i) (1977).
86. The JAPC introduced the legislation in both houses through HB 808 and SB 553. FLA.
H.R. JoUR. 98 (Reg. Sess. 1977); FLA. S. JouR. 72 (Reg. Sess. 1977). HB 808 was eventually
withdrawn from consideration. FLA. H.R. Joun. 1052 (Reg. Sess. 1977).
87. Dem.-Daytona Beach. Representative Brown was chairman of the House Governmental Operations Committee.
88. Dem.-Palm Beach. Senator Lewis was chairman of the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee.
89. The original bill dealt with no other subject. See Fla. SB 553 (1977).
90. When SB 553 was passed by the senate, it contained only the standing provision which
was later to become § 11.60(2)(i), Florida Statutes. All of the other provisions of ch. 77-453,
Laws of Florida, including the rulemaking and noticing exemptions, as well as the comptroller's exemption discussed supra, were added via amendment in the house. See FLA. H.R.
JouR. 704-07, 849-53, 1073-74 (Reg. Sess. 1977).
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in new paragraph (i) of subsection (2) of section 11.60, Florida Statutes, states:
(2) The committee shall:
(i) Have standing to seek review in the courts of the state, on
behalf of the Legislature or the citizens of Florida, of the validity
or invalidity of any administrative rule to which the committee has
voted an objection and which has not been withdrawn, modified,
repealed, or amended to meet the objection. Judicial review under
this paragraph shall not be initiated until the Governor and the
agency head of the agency [making the rule to which the committee has objected] have been notified of the committee's proposed
action and have been given a reasonable opportunity for consultation with the committee. The committee is hereby authorized to
expend public funds from its appropriation for the purpose of
seeking judicial review.
The provisions of the new law are simple and straightforward, but
arguably they are unconstitutional and violative of the separation
of powers which is guaranteed by article II, section 3 of the Florida
Constitution."
Without hesitation, the Florida Senate passed Senate Bill 553 and
forwarded it for consideration to the house,9" where it was the subject of much discussion and disagreement. Senate Bill 553 was
amended by the full House Governmental Operations Committee.
Among other provisions, the committee added a specific provision
which prohibited the initiation of suit until such time as the
"Governor and the Agency head of the agency have been notified of
the committee's proposed action and have been given a reasonable
opportunity for consultation with the committee."9 The inclusion
of this new language was a compromise by opponents to the standing provision,"4 but it in no way lessens the potential power of the
Joint Administrative Procedures Committee over agency rulemaking decisions.
The legislature possesses full power to rectify any problem arising
from agency action. It can change the law or take retributive action
91. Article I, section 3 of the Florida Constitution provides: "The powers of the state
government shall be divided into legislative, executive and judicial branches. No person
belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other branches
unless expressly provided herein."
92. SB 553 was introduced in the senate on April 5, 1977, passed by a 34-2 vote, and
certified to the house on April 22, 1977. FA.S. JouR. 72, 207 (Reg. Sess. 1977).
93. SB 553 initially contained no such agency/committee consultation provision. See Fla.
SB 553 (1977); note 90 supra.
94. The adoption of the consultation clause was moved by the author.-Ed.
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through the budget process. The standing provision ignores that
reality. Instead, it pits legislative attorneys against agency attorneys in court, causing the expenditure of substantial amounts of tax
dollars in legal battles over issues which could easily be solved at
the next legislative session. In such a contest, the legislature will
always have the upper hand. For, should it lose in court, it can
merely change the law in the next session to the disadvantage of the
agency.
The propriety of delegating the power to sue on behalf of the
entire legislature to the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee is questionable. Historically, legislators have exercised power as
a political body. As such, the legislature must speak in unison or not
at all if its actions are to carry the weight of policy. The legislative
voice is a powerful one which has traditionally been heard only after
debate and deliberation. The standing provision allows six members
of the legislature to bind the entire body after no substantial debate
or deliberation.
The extent of the committee's power may not be evident at first.
But a subtle change in the bargaining process between the committee and executive agencies has taken place. The committee now
holds the upper hand. Formerly, if an agency disagreed with the
committee objection, it could ignore it and take its chances with the
full legislature. Now the tables are turned. Instead of taking chances
with the entire legislature, the agency must go to court and absorb
the costs of the litigation in its budget. Furthermore, the legislature,
through the budgetary process, can always reduce the capability of
an agency to defend itself against committee-initiated judicial rule
determinations. The legislature need only reduce the amount of
money available to the agency for attorneys' fees or for the hiring
of their own attorneys. The consequences of incurring litigation expenses will no doubt make agency heads think twice before proceeding with what may be a well-founded legal position.
By passage of the standing provision, the legislature has clearly
taken action to do that which the public itself would not allow the
legislature to do by constitutional amendment. This raises serious
questions as to whether the legislature's action was in keeping with
the public sentiment as expressed in the 1976 election.
Furthermore, standing provisions in other states have been
stricken as violative of separation of powers. In an early case,
Stockman v. Leddy,"5 an attempt by the Colorado Legislature to
authorize a legislative committee to sue and be sued was stricken
95.

129 P. 220 (Colo. 1912).
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as violating the separation of powers. More recently, in State v.
State Office Building Commission,6 the Supreme Court of Kansas
held that a Kansas statute which gave a legislative committee the
power to sue and be sued was an encroachment on the power of the
executive and therefore unconstitutional.
Article IV, section 1(b), of the Florida Constitution provides:
"The Governor may initiate judicial proceedings in the name of the
state against any executive or administrative state, county or municipal officer to enforce compliance with any duty or restrain any
unauthorized act." Clearly this provision empowers the Governor to
take the same sort of action contemplated by the standing provision
against officials neglecting their duty or exceeding their authority.
Arguably, this provision impliedly authorizes legislative action, for
the Governor's power is discretionary, not compulsory. Consider,
however, the language of the court in State ex rel. Ellars v. Board
of County Commissioners:7
The principle is well established that where the Constitution expressly provides the manner of doing a thing, it impliedly forbids
its being done in a substantially different manner. Even though
the Constitution does not in terms prohibit the doing of a thing in
another manner, the fact that it has prescribed the manner in
which the thing shall be done is itself a prohibition against a different manner of doing it. . . . Therefore, when the Constitution
prescribes the manner of doing an act, the manner prescribed is
exclusive, and it is beyond the power of the Legislature to enact a
statute that would defeat the purpose of the constitutional provision.
It seems clear that the court felt quite strongly that the provisions
of the constitution provided express bounds within which the legislature could act. The fact that the constitution indicates that the
Governor may initiate judicial proceedings may well disclose an
intent to prohibit the legislature from taking such action.
Article IV, section 1(a) of the Florida Constitution provides that
"[tihe supreme executive power shall be vested in a governor." In
8 the court held that "taking care
State ex rel. Fleming v. Crawford,"
that the laws be faithfully executed" included the bringing of an
action in the name of the state to settle a controversy over commissioning a United States Senator. And, in In re Executive Communication Concerning Powers of Legislature,99 the court noted that:
96.
97.
98.
99.

345 P.2d 674 (Kan. 1959).
3 So. 2d 360, 362 (Fla. 1941) (citations omitted).
10 So. 118 (Fla, 1891).
6 So. 925 (Fla. 1887).
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"The exact legal meaning of the word
times authoritatively fixed and defined.
ing to the execution of the laws as they
In Modlin v. City of Miami Beach,"°"
functions of the three branches:

'executive' has been many
It means a duty appertainexist."'"
the court distinguished the

The distinction between legislative action, on the one hand, and
executive and judicial action, on the other, is not difficult to define. It is sufficient for present purposes to say that the former is
typically prospective and nondiscriminatory, whereas the latter
operate retroactively and discriminatorily. In other words, legislative action prescribes a general rule for future operations, whereas
judicial and executive action is typically concerned with applying
0
the general rule to specific situations or persons.'1
It is reasonable to assume that before too many suits have been
initiated by the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee, an
affected party will challenge the basis of the committee's standing
on constitutional grounds. Until then, however, the effects of this
statutory change could very well inhibit individual agency actions.
Agency heads will weigh the force pitted against them on an individual rule challenge to determine if the value of that rule exceeds the
expense involved in going to court. Thus, the dangers of this new
grant of authority to the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee extend not just to litigation itself but to the many suits which
will never be litigated by cautious and wary executive agencies.
IV.

ADDITIONAL AMENDMENTS TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE

ACT MADE DURING THE 1977 LEGISLATIVE SESSION
Although the exemption granted to the Department of Banking
and Finance and the standing provision were the two most farreaching actions affecting the APA taken by the 1977 legislature,
several other changes in that Act were made.
A subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee introduced an amendment to the APA requiring legislative approval of
any rule establishing standards more restrictive than existing federal standards." 3 That bill, House Bill 2162, was referred to the
House Committee on Governmental Operations and ultimately to
the APA subcommittee.0 4 The subcommittee reported the bill unfa100. Id.
101.
102.
103.
104.

201 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1967).
Id. at 73.
Fla. HB 2162 (1977).
HB 2162 was referred to the House Committee on Governmental Operations on May
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vorably as did the full Governmental Operations Committee., 5
After the House Governmental Operations Committee had acted
unfavorably on the bill, proponents of the provision amended a
watered-down version of their concept onto the APA standing bill,
Senate Bill 553.I °s Representative Fred Jones' 7 moved the adoption

of an amendment to Senate Bill 553. Amendment four required the
Administrative Procedures Committee, in its annual report to the
legislature, to set forth "a listing of agency rules and regulations
which established standards more restrictive than federal standards.' 018 Jones' amendment was adopted by the house, but rejected
by the senate.'00 After the senate's rejection of amendment 4, Representatives Jones and Elaine Bloom"10 offered an amendment directed to agency rulemaking rather than to the joint committee's
annual report."' Both the house and the senate accepted this
amendment, which is now section 120.54(11)(a), Florida Statutes."'
The members of the subcommittee also realized that there was no
centralized method of recording exemptions granted under section
120.63 of the Administrative Procedure Act. "3 To remedy that problem, Representatives Curt Kiser, George Sheldon, and J. Hyatt
Brown, offered an amendment to Senate Bill 553 which required the
secretary of state to issue an order specifically granting or denying
the exemption and to specify the process of proceedings exempted.",
These orders were to be published in the Florida Administrative
Weekly.

15

Prior to the 1977 amendment, it was unclear how long exemptions
granted by the Administration Commission were to remain in effect.
The old statute provided that an exemption (or any alternate procedure prescribed) would terminate ninety days following adjournment sine die of the next legislative session."' The subcommittee
4, 1977. FLA. H.R.

JOUR. 411 (Reg. Sess. 1977).
105. Id. at 654.
106. Fla. H.R. amend. 4 to SB 553, FLA. H.R. JouR. 707 (Reg. Sess. 1977).
107. Dem.-Aubumdale.
108. Fla. H.R. amend. 4 to SB 553, FLA. H.R. JouR. 707 (Reg. Sess. 1977).
109. FLA. H.R. JoUR. 707 (Reg. Sess. 1977); FLA. S. Joua. 559 (Reg. Sess. 1977).
110. Dem.-North Miami Beach.
111. Fla. H.R. amend. 10 to SB 553, FLA. H.R. Joua. 852 (Reg. Sess. 1977).
112. Ch. 77-453, § 3, 1977 Fla. Laws 1831.
113. Section 120.63, Florida Statutes (1977), provides that the administration commission
may, in certain circumstances, exempt any agency process or proceeding from the requirements of chapter 120.
114. Fla. H.R. amend. 2 to SB 553, § 9, FLA. H.R. Joua. 707 (Reg. Sess. 1977).
115. Id.
116. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 74-310, § 1, 1974 Fla. Laws 952, 967 (current
version at FLA. STAT. § 120.63(2)(b) (1977)).

1978]

APA AMENDMENTS

members were thus concerned about particular exemptions which
might be granted during a legislative session. To forestall arguments
that such exemptions should remain in effect until the following
legislative session, the subcommittee proposed the following change
in the language: "shall terminate ninety days following adjournment sine die of the current or next regular legislative session
... ,)11 This provision, as well as the foregoing provisions dealing
with exemption orders, eventually became law."'
The subcommittee's concern with the expiration date of exemptions was due in large part to an exemption granted to the Department of Offender Rehabilitation. The department had been granted
an exemption by the Administration Commission prior to the 1977
legislative session." 9 Officials at the department had sought a permanent exemption from the requirements of the APA.2 0
In a memorandum to the APA subcommittee, the Department of
Offender Rehabilitation expressed concern that because prisoners
were not specifically excluded from the APA's definition of "party,"
prisoners could demand hearings whenever their substantial interests were affected. 2 ' For the department, actions affecting the substantial interests of prisoners would include disciplinary actions,
transfers both within a prison facility and from one facility to another, security risk classifications, work release program assignments, job assignments, and educational benefits.'22 The department claimed that if disciplinary hearings alone were conducted by
DOAH hearing officers, the DOAH caseload would increase 800%.'2
Counsel for the department stated that the department annually
conducts about 16,000 disciplinary hearings, makes about 9,000
inmate transfers, and makes nearly 18,000 job assignments. 2 In
117. Fla. H.R. amend, to SB 553, § 9, FLA. H.R. JouR. 707 (Reg. Sess. 1977).
118. Ch. 77-453, §§ 4, 8, 1977 Fla. Laws 1831 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 120.55(1)(b),
.63(2)(b) (1977)).
119. Letter from Wallace W. Henderson, Ass't Sec'y, Dep't of Administration, State of
Florida, to Louie L. Wainwright, Sec'y, Dep't of Offender Rehabilitation, State of Florida
(May 3, 1977).
120. Memorandum from Earl H. Archer, Ill, Attorney, Dep't of Offender Rehabilitation,
Division of Health and Rehabilitative Services, State of Florida, to House Comm. on Gov't
Operations, Subcommittee on Administrative Procedure Act, at 1 (undated) (on file with
committee) [hereinafter cited as Dep't of Offender Rehabilitation Memorandum].
Section 120.52(10), Florida Statutes (1977), defines "party" for purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act to include both specifically named persons whose substantial interests are
being determined in the proceeding and any other person who, as a matter of constitutional
right or by statutory or regulatory provision, is entitled to participate in whole or in part in
the proceeding.
121. Dep't of Offender Rehabilitation Memorandum, supra note 120, at 1.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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contrast, the Department of Offender Rehabilitation attorney
pointed out, in 1976, DOAH received only 2,200 petitions from all
state agencies combined." 5 The Department of Offender Rehabilitation argued that if it were not exempted from APA requirements a
decrease in its "ability to manage prisons" would result.",6 This
argument seemingly ignores the United States Supreme Court's requirement of procedural safeguards in disciplinary hearings.'27 The
department's position does not take into account its rulemaking
capability, nor does it reflect an awareness of emergency rulemaking
procedures. The department offered no specific information as to
why it should be exempt from chapter 120 rulemaking require12 8

ments.

The findings of the Division of Administrative Hearings in Jerry
v. FloridaDepartment of Offender Rehabilitationhad not yet been
set aside by the First District Court of Appeal at the time the department was making its argument before the legislature. In that
case, the hearing officer declared invalid rule 33-3.08(2), which established departmental disciplinary procedures, as violative of section 120.57, Florida Statutes.2 9 On the basis of the hearing officer's
order, the department warned legislators that Jerry would open the
floodgates for prisoners appealing disciplinary actions. However,
this argument was weakened when the First District Court of Appeal reversed the hearing officer's decision. The court found inmate
Jerry lacked standing to challenge the rule:
Jerry ... has failed to show injury which is accompanied by any
continuing, present adverse effects. He has failed to demonstrate,
either at the time his petition for administrative relief was filed or
at the time of the hearing, that he was then serving disciplinary
confinement or that his existing prison sentence had been subjected to loss of gain-time ...
. . . Jerry's prospects of future injury rest on the likelihood that
he will again be subjected to disciplinary confinement because of
possible future infractions of Rule 33-3.08(2). Whether this will
occur, however, is a matter of speculation and conjecture. .... 130
While this holding will not allay the fears of the department,
nonetheless, it does indicate that it will be increasingly difficult for
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See Wolff v. McDonald, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
128. See Dep't of Offender Rehabilitation Memorandum, supra note 120.
129. No. 76-1951 R (Fla. Div. of Admin. Hearings Mar. 1, 1977), rev'd, 353 So. 2d 1230
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
130. 353 So. 2d at 1235-36.

19781

APA AMENDMENTS

a prisoner to challenge a departmental decision or rule unless he has
first proven that the decision or rule directly and currently affects
his substantial interests. Under Jerry, this appears to be particularly true if the prisoner has already served his disciplinary confinement and has not proven a loss in gain time.
While the department has been successful in maintaining that the
Administration Commission exemption does not expire until after
the 1978 legislative session, officials do realize that 1978 is their last
year under any theory. Nonetheless, the 1978 legislature passed a
bill exempting prisoners from certain provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act.'1'
V.

CONCLUSION

What, then, is the state of the Administrative Procedure Act in
1978 and what will be its future? Each state agency believes it is
unique. Each agency contends that statutory procedures must be
adapted to its particular needs. We have seen this with the school
boards, the boards of trustees of community colleges, the comptroller, and the Department of Offender Rehabilitation, to name just a
few. But the desire for uniformity which is at the heart of the APA
will not be fulfilled by treating everyone differently.
Underlying the feeling of uniqueness in each agency is a basic lack
of understanding of the APA process itself. We have pointed out
that most of the problems identified by the comptroller were of his
own making. Even McDonald verifies that fact. And that holding
did not create half the problems for the comptroller that he anticipated. This is also clear, to a somewhat lesser extent, in the Jerry
case. The Department of Offender Rehabilitation has now been told
by the court that a prisoner will have a difficult time acquiring
standing to challenge the department's rules or orders. The prisoner
must be very specific in his allegations and must be in a situation
where his substantial interests are currently being affected by the
department's actions. Yet neither the comptroller nor the Secretary
of the Department of Offender Rehabilitation seems to recognize
that he can, by rule, establish procedures and guidelines which
could channel the challenges to his decisionmaking.
An analysis of the exemptions and alterations granted during the
1977 legislative session leads to the conclusion that, for the most
131. Bills providing for the exemption were introduced in both the house and the senate
during the 1978 legislative session. Fla. HB 420 (1978); Fla. SB 209 (1978). Senate Bill 209
was substituted for the house bill and was passed by both houses. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 215 (Reg.
Sess. 1978). It was signed into law by the Governor on May 8, 1978.
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part, the changes were ill advised. They detract from the uniformity
which assures fairness under the APA. This appears to be true not
simply from the standpoint of protecting the intent of the Administrative Procedure Act, but also from the standpoint of an affected
party who simply wishes to influence the decisions his government
is making.
The exemption granted to the comptroller by the 1977 legislative
session and the exemption granted to the Department of Offender
Rehabilitation could easily be abolished in 1978. For both will expire
in the absence of specific legislative action. But the real issue is
whether or not those actions have established a trend toward a slow
but ever certain erosion of the Act. That possibility clearly exists.
A few exemptions could very well lead to many more. And what then
would be the worth of the APA?
By enacting the APA, the legislature has told the people of Florida that it will assure them of a practical means to challenge the
decisions of executive agencies. The legislature has promised to still
the invisible hand of arbitrary government by imposing uniformity
on the confusing administrative process. But now the legislature is
under increasing pressure to depart from the promise of uniformity
and yield to the pleas for more and more exceptions. Persuading
each state agency that it is not necessarily unique will not be easy.
But it must be done.
The decision of the legislature to give itself standing to sue in
court to challenge administrative rules reflects a growing legislative
desire to escape from the very process in which it has required all
affected parties to participate. The legislature has demonstrated
with this change in the law that at least one entity need not meet
all the formal requirements of substantial interest in order to challenge administrative rulemaking. It would appear that the legislature wants not only to write the laws but also to perform the traditionally judicial role of interpreting them. Moreover, the decision to
override any rule more restrictive than a federal guideline is an
additional demonstration of a mounting legislative desire to overshadow the executive branch by the exercise of a legislative veto.
While no student of state government would challenge the right of
a legislature to set policy and monitor the implementation of that
policy, few would contend that the legislature should be allowed to
offset the checks and balances which have historically existed
among the three branches of government in Florida.
Two premises should be clearly established if the purposes and
the intent of the Administrative Procedure Act are to be achieved.
First, the process should be uniform for all agencies and parties
unless a clear and convincing case can be made that the public

19781

APA AMENDMENTS

would be better served by an exemption. And that clear and convincing case must be made based on the public interest. It cannot
be founded on the interests of a vested few with particular desires
for a streamlined process offering fewer opportunities for others to
be heard.
Second, the legislature must accept its own directives and recognize that it too is an entity of government which is to serve the
public with the same uniformity and openness it is demanding from
the executive branch. Popular distrust of government is not confined to the executive branch. This must not be forgotten. The
legislature must learn to restrict itself to making the laws and resist
the temptation to interpret them as well.
The Administrative Procedure Act is working in Florida. But it
is being continually tested. If the present trend is allowed to continue, the Act may gradually be eroded until Florida is back where
it began-with a haphazard and complicated administrative process.

